Symposium Introduction:  Treatment of Financial Contracts in Bankruptcy and Bank Resolution by Janger, Edward








Symposium Introduction: Treatment of Financial
Contracts in Bankruptcy and Bank Resolution
Edward Janger
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation




TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL CONTRACTS IN
BANKRUPTCY AND BANK RESOLUTION
Edward J. Janger*
The legal architecture for addressing the failure of a financial firm
straddles the law of bank resolution and enterprise bankruptcy. As a result,
different entities in the same corporate group may find themselves governed
by different bodies of law, or even uncertain which one applies. Where
financial contracts are involved, the two regimes follow radically different
approaches. This symposium explores how the asymmetry created by the
so-TlHHQS kl0I+(-)Th N*lOQ Ll+k/+*8 complicates the straddle, makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to restructure a financial firm in bankruptcy
court or elsewhere, and may also undercut the ability of a bankruptcy court
to restructure a non-financial firm.
This introduction briefly provides an overview of the two conflicting
treatments of financial contracts in bankruptcy and bank resolution, the
relevant legal instruments, and the legal developments since 2008. The
Articles in this symposium each explore aspects of this problem and suggest
reforms.
I. BACKGROUND EXAMPLE: SAFE HARBORS AND SIFIS
UNDER U.S. LAW
The safety and soundness of the financial system and the content of
bankruptcy law are closely intertwined. In the United States, concern about
contagion and bank runs, often associated with economic downturns, dates
back to the Great Depression and before. Events with significance for the
financial system can originate either in the financial sector (Wall Street), or
in the regular economy (Main Street). The dividing line between the
financial system and the ordinary economy is not clear. In the United
States, however, these overlapping systems are handled by two distinct
legal architecturesPone for banks and one for ordinary businesses.
* David M. Barse Professor, Brooklyn Law School, and Co-Director, Brooklyn Law School
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Discussion at World Bank Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force Meeting (World
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Concerns about bank failure and bank runs are handled by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and other bank regulators, while
failure or reorganization of Nordinary firms8 is handled through bankruptcy
under Title 11 of the U.S. Code (Bankruptcy Code).1 While the recent
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank Act) 2 shifts the dividing line by treating systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs) more like banks, this Main
Street/Wall Street division remains legally intact. Indeed, it may even have
been reinforced by Dodd-Frank. Large investment banks were always on
the NWall Street8 side of the equation. 3 However, it never occurred to
anybody that they might fail, so they were left out of the ]pZ!4* kl0I
resolution jurisdiction. The financial crisis and Dodd-Frank Act changed all
that, but concerns remain. Many large financial firms are not banks or SIFIs
(e.g., a large hedge fund), and the failure of non-financial firms (e.g.,
Chrysler or GM) can have systemic effects.
The key difference between the two regimes emerged after the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, when a number of adjustments
were made to the ordinary bankruptcy regime to accommodate the
perceived needs of financial markets. The first generation of
accommodations was embodied in a series of provisions exempting certain
types of financial contracts from the automatic stay and avoidance.4 These
so-called Nsafe harbors8 or Nimmunities8 were incorporated into the
Bankruptcy Code, first in the 1980s, and then expanded significantly in
2005. Until recently, they were viewed as Nbest practices,8 reflected in the
IMF/World Bank Insolvency and Creditors4 Rights Regimes ROSC
Assessment Methodology (ROSC Methodology) discussed below,5 and, as
noted in Professor Mokal4s contribution to this symposium, they remain a
feature in UNCITRAL4s Legislative Guide for Insolvency (Legislative
1. Compare Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
(providing resolution procedures for FDIC insured banks), and Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 201R214, 124 Stat.
1376, 1442R1518 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381R5394 (2012)) (providing resolution
procedures for systemically significant financial institutions), with the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 109 (2012) (permitting bankruptcy relief for individual and enterprise debtors).
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111R203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
3. Even after Dodd-Frank, discussed infra, financial firms are expected to use bankruptcy
unless to do so would have systemic consequences. See 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2) (2012).
4. Stockbroker-Commodity Broker Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Pub. L. No. 97-
222, 96 Stat. 235 (1982) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6) and adding §§ 555, 556 (2012)). See
also In re Grafton Partners, 321 B.R. 527, 532R33 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (Klein, J.) (NPublic Law
97-222 was a package of amendments designed to protect the carefully-regulated mechanisms for
clearing trades in securities and commodities in the public markets from [the] dysfunction that
could result from the automatic stay and from certain trustee avoiding powers.8).
5. See infra Part II.E.
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Guide). 6 The articulated concern that motivated the safe harbors was
clearancePor intermediaryPrisk; a broker-dealer or other financial firm
might fail, and the automatic stay and the prospect of avoidance might
disrupt the clearance of transactions and undermine confidence in securities
markets. When the safe harbors were first added to the Bankruptcy Code in
1982, the House Report stated:
The commodities and securities markets operate through a complex
system of accounts and guarantees. Because of the structure of the
clearing systems in these industries and the sometimes volatile nature [of]
the markets, certain protections are necessary to prevent the insolvency of
one commodity or security firm from spreading to other firms and
possibly threatening the collapse of the affected market.7
This quotation does not reflect a concern with so-called NToo Big To Fail8
or Nsystemically important8 financial institutions. Quite the contrary, the
paradigmatic institution was assumed to be a financial intermediary that
was not too big to fail. The failure of the intermediary itself was not
expected to have systemic effects. Instead, the concern was with the effect
of certain bankruptcy rules on trading and clearance within certain financial
product markets if a small financial firm failed. The concern was about
Wall Street, but not about the safety and soundness of the banking system
generally.8 The resulting adjustments to the Bankruptcy Code reflected a
desire to preserve the liquidity of securities markets, even at the expense of
the insolvent financial firm itselfPwhich would likely be liquidated under
the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) 9 Pand the firm4s non-
financial creditors.
These adjustments took two forms. First, certain transactions were
exempted from the automatic stay, so: (1) Nipso facto8 or Ntermination8
clauses could be enforced upon bankruptcy; (2) obligations arising out of
transactions between counterparties could be set off on an aggregate basis
(netted); and (3) any collateral securing the contract or contracts could be
6. U.N. COMM4N ON INT4L TRADE L., UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY
LAW, recs. 101R07, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVEGUIDE].
7. H. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1R2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583 (emphasis
added).
8. While it is not the focus of this symposium, it is important to note that this quote does not
reflect a concern about transactions that do not involve a securities intermediary, and may cast in
doubt the Second Circuit4s recent interpretation of these sections. See In re Bernard L. Madoff
Inv. Sec. LLC, 773 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2014); In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., 651 F.3d 329
(2d Cir. 2011); but see In re MacMenamin4s Grill, Ltd., 450 B.R. 414, 425 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2011) (excluding payments from safe harbored treatment by noting that they were not Nfinancial
markets8 transactions with systemic risk implications, but probably overruled sub silentio by the
Madoff case).
9. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaaR78lll (2012)).
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sold. 10 Collectively, these features are often referred to as Ncloseout
netting,8 but really there are three steps: termination, setoff, and sale of
collateral. Second, these same transactions were treated as final and exempt
from preference or other later avoidance for any reason other than
intentional (or actual) fraud.11
The cumulative effect of these provisions is to allow certain creditors to
make themselves whole notwithstanding bankruptcy, while reducing the
distribution to other claimants. More importantly, the financial contracts
subject to netting are not available for use by the debtor as cash collateral.12
Hence, the safe harbors have two second-order consequences. They prefer
one set of creditors to others, and they reduce the debtor4s available cash,
thereby limiting or eliminating the possibility for successful reorganization
or going concern sale.
The FDIC and U.S. bank regulators follow a different approach to bank
insolvency than the Bankruptcy Code. Banks largely hold financial assets,
rather than hard assets. Because these assets are liquid and the value is not
directly linked to the bank4s business operations, the usual practice is to
quickly divide the failed bank into two pieces: a good bankPcontaining
performing assets and assets with readily ascertainable value; and a bad
bankPcontaining non-performing or illiquid assets. The performing assets
are then sold to another financial institution, while the non-performing
assets are transferred to the government. Key differences between
bankruptcy and bank resolution are: (1) unlike bankruptcy, which may take
an extended period of time, these Nbridge bank8 transactions are generally
accomplished over a weekend, and completed before the end of the business
day on Monday; and (2) there is no exemption or Nsafe harbor8 for financial
contracts. Indeed, as discussed below, the termination of financial contract
is subject to a short stay. The transfer of the financial contract to another
financial institution is then deemed to cure any default. In short, netting is
stayed briefly, and then resumes in the ordinary course once the financial
contract is transferred, but no Ntermination8 or Ncloseout8 occurs.
Significantly, the focus of the bank resolution regime is not contagion
as a result of lost liquidity due to clearance delay (i.e., Nintermediary8 or
10. Many derivative counterparties who engage in repeated or multiple transactions conduct
their affairs pursuant to a master netting agreement that provides for contract based netting rights.
This is one way in which closeout netting, in this context, has a more extensive ambit than
standard setoff rights arising by operation of law in many legal systems. See INT4L INST. FOR THE
UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW [UNIDROIT], PRINCIPLES ON THE OPERATION OF CLOSE-OUT
NETTING PROVISIONS 1R2 (2013) [hereinafter UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES],
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/netting/netting-principles2013-e.pdf. The current safe
harbors can be found at 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6), (7), (17), (27), 546(e)R(g), 555R556, 559R561
(2012).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e), (g).
12. See id. § 363(c).
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Nclearance8 risk). The contagion concern is more immediate; the failure of
one institution may have an effect on its counterparties directly. This is
sometimes referred to as Ncounterparty risk8 or NToo Big To Fail8 risk.
Lehman Brothers demonstrated the mismatch between these distinct
approaches to systemic risk.13 Lehman, like other investment banks, did not
take customer deposits, so they were not under the jurisdiction of the FDIC.
As an investment bank, however, many of Lehman4s assets and liabilities
fell into the Nsafe harbored8 category. With no bankruptcy stay or short
stay, the early termination of financial contracts proved a serious problem in
maximizing the value of Lehman4s assets.14 More specifically, even though
a sale to Barclay4s was in the works, the absence of a bankruptcy stay
meant that a regulatory delay in the United Kingdom made it impossible to
complete a going concern sale. The consequences of Lehman4s disorderly
failure are still being felt today.
The legislative response to Lehman4s failure took the form of Title II of
the Dodd-Frank Act. 15 The Dodd-Frank Act expanded the FDIC4s
jurisdiction to include SIFIs. 16 In other words, large nonbank financial
institutions were given access to the bank resolution regime in cases where
resolution in bankruptcy would create systemic risk.
Even after the Dodd-Frank Act, the regimes for treatment of financial
contracts remain divided between the bank resolution regimePfocused on
limiting contagion caused by the failure of a systemically significant
counterparty, and the ordinary bankruptcy regimePfocused on isolating
clearance or intermediary risk caused by the failure of a systemically
insignificant intermediary. The risks are not identical, and the approaches
followed in the two systems sometimes work at cross-purposes. As Lehman
illustrated, because of its size, the possibility of Lehman defaulting on its
own contracts had systemic risk implications. It appears that protecting the
early termination and netting rights of Lehman counterparties may have
actually accelerated the contagion. The ensuing panic nearly Nbroke the
buck,8 endangering the securities in money market mutual funds that were
axiomatically supposed to trade at par. 17 Where the counterparty is
systemically significant, the perceived imperatives of the two systems must
be balanced against each other and perhaps reexamined to more effectively
address future systemic crises.
13. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469
(2010).
14. See Mark J. Roe & Stephen D. Adams, Restructuring Financial Firms in Bankruptcy:
Lessons from Lehman (Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 796, 2014).
15. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111R203, tit. II, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442 (2010).
16. Id. §§ 161, 165, 203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1420R1421, 1423R1432, 1450R1454.
17. Philip Swagel, Why Lehman Wasn1t Rescued, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013, 1:18 PM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/why-lehman-wasnt-rescued/?_php=true&_type=bl
ogs&_r=0.
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II. POST-CRISIS DEVELOPMENTS AND SUBSEQUENT
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Since the 2008 financial crisis, there have been significant
developments in the approach to systemic risk in the financial system. In
the United States, this was manifested through the enactment of Titles I and
II to the Dodd-Frank Act discussed above. At the international level, the
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and UNIDROIT have reevaluated the
appropriate framework from a post-crisis perspective.
Under these newer standards, preservation of liquidity remains
important, but the scope of the recommended safe harbors has been
narrowed to focus more tightly on intermediary risk, reaching only
transactions where a financial institution is actually involved. With regard
to counterparty risk, by contrast, the focus has been expanded beyond
resolution of banks to include non-bank SIFIs.
A. FSBKEYATTRIBUTES
The FSB has published a list of NKey Attributes8 for resolution of
financial institutions.18 Their approach to netting follows the FDIC bank
18. FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2014) [hereinafter FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES],
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf. The Key Attributes
provides in pertinent part:
4. Set-off, netting, collateralisation, segregation of client assets
4.1 The legal framework governing set-off rights, contractual netting and
collateralisation agreements and the segregation of client assets should be clear,
transparent and enforceable during a crisis or resolution of firms, and should not
hamper the effective implementation of resolution measures.
4.2 Subject to adequate safeguards, entry into resolution and the exercise of any
resolution powers should not trigger statutory or contractual set-off rights, or constitute
an event that entitles any counterparty of the firm in resolution to exercise contractual
acceleration or early termination rights provided the substantive obligations under the
contract continue to be performed.
4.3 Should contractual acceleration or early termination rights nevertheless be
exercisable, the resolution authority should have the power to stay temporarily such
rights where they arise by reason only of entry into resolution or in connection with the
exercise of any resolution powers. The stay should:
(i) be strictly limited in time (for example, for a period not exceeding 2 business
days);
(ii) be subject to adequate safeguards that protect the integrity of financial
contracts and provide certainty to counterparties (see Annex IV on Conditions for
a temporary stay); and
(iii) not affect the exercise of early termination rights of a counterparty against the
firm being resolved in the case of any event of default not related to entry into
resolution or the exercise of the relevant resolution power occurring before, during
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regime described above, not the bankruptcy regime. Section 4 of the Key
Attributes recommends either limiting early termination rights to exclude
entry of the firm into resolution, or imposing a short stay.19 Unlike the Nsafe
harbor8 approach used in bankruptcy (i.e., general enterprise insolvency),
commencement of the resolution of a financial institution is not a basis for
early termination of financial contracts. Even if termination is provided for
by contract, such termination is stayed for a short period. The purpose of
the stay is to permit the resolution authority to arrange for a transfer of
assets to another solvent financial institution.
Such a transfer would accomplish nothing if upon transfer of the assets
the contracts were still subject to early termination, so upon transfer, the
termination of financial contracts is further stayedPor more accurately
deemed not a default.20 In short, unlike the bankruptcy safe harbor regime
that contemplates immediate termination, netting, and protection of finality
notwithstanding insolvency, the regime proposed by the FSB Key
Attributes contemplates preservation of netting rights. However, if all
works as planned, premature termination and close-out netting will not
occur, but neither will any market disruption, beyond the short stay.
or after the period of the stay (for example, failure to make a payment, deliver or
return collateral on a due date).
The stay may be discretionary (imposed by the resolution authority) or automatic in its
operation. In either case, jurisdictions should ensure that there is clarity as to the
beginning and the end of the stay.
4.4 Resolution authorities should apply the temporary stay on early termination rights
in accordance with the guidance set out in Annex IV to ensure that it does not
compromise the safe and orderly operations of regulated exchanges and FMIs.
Id. at 10R11 (Key Attribute 4).
19. Id.
20. Id. Key Attribute 3.3 provides in pertinent part:
Transfer of assets and liabilities
3.3 Resolution authorities should have the power to transfer selected assets and
liabilities of the failed firm to a third party institution or to a newly established bridge
institution. Any transfer of assets or liabilities should not:
(i) require the consent of any interested party or creditor to be valid; and
(ii) constitute a default or termination event in relation to any obligation relating to
such assets or liabilities or under any contract to which the failed firm is a party
(see Key Attribute 4.2).
8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 10
B. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES ON THEOPERATION OFCLOSE-OUT
NETTING PROVISIONS
UNIDROIT has similarly developed a set of principles on close-out
netting for financial contracts (UNIDROIT Principles).21 While the FSB
Key Attributes apply only to close-out netting in the context of financial
institution resolution, the UNIDROIT Principles provide guidance on the
operation of close-out netting generally, including their operation in
insolvency. In this respect, they are designed also to apply to the
insolvencies of entities that are not financial institutions. While the two sets
of principles can be reconciled, there are some important differences in
approach.
The UNIDROIT Principles advocate respect of close-out netting
provisions in financial contracts. They are narrower than the U.S. safe
harbors, described above, and the approach advocated by such pre-crisis
instruments as the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. 22 The specific
differences are:
! As a suggested minimum standard, the definition of financial
contract is limited to those contracts where one of the parties is a
financial institution or public authority.
! They take account of the possibility that the domestic law will
impose a stay on termination of financial contracts in the context of
its bank resolution regime.
! Neither the Key Attributes nor the UNIDROIT Principles address
issues relating to sale of collateral or insulation from later
avoidance as a preference or constructive fraudulent conveyance.23
Principle 1 defines the scope of the UNIDROIT Principles as limited to
transactions where at least one party is a financial institution or central
bank.24 It states that the UNIDROIT Principles, Ndeal with the operation of
close-out netting provisions that are entered into by eligible parties in
respect of eligible obligations.825 NEligible parties,8 include any person who
is not an individual engaged in a consumer transaction. 26 NEligible
obligations,8 are defined in Principle 4 as any of a wide variety of financial
contracts where at least one party is a Nqualifying financial market
participant8 or Npublic authority.8 27 For transactions covered by the
21. UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 10.
22. LEGISLATIVEGUIDE, supra note 6, recs. 101R07.
23. Though, under UNIDROIT Principle 7.1(c), the act of netting post-petition, pursuant to the
safe harbor would not, in and of itself, be a basis for avoidance. UNIDROIT NETTING
PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, princ. 7.1(c).
24. Id. princ. 1.
25. Id.
26. Id. princ. 3.
27. Id. princ. 4. Those terms are defined in Principle 3 as follows:
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UNIDROIT Principles, Principle 7 states that early termination and
closeout of the transaction would not be stayed.28 However, under Principle
8, if there is a stay under the nation4s bank resolution regime, that stay
would still apply with regard to the insolvency of the financial institution.29
Thus, if the debtor is a financial institution, a short stay will likely
apply to its financial contracts when it is resolved, but if the debtor is a non-
financial institution that has entered into a financial contract with a financial
institution, the netting of the transaction will not be stayed. The UNIDROIT
Principles, thus, provide safe harbors for derivatives when they are an asset
held by a financial institution and the debtor is not subject to the bank
resolution regime. By contrast, a short stay is likely to apply and
termination is likely to be foreclosed when it is the bank itself that fails and
owes obligations under the financial contract.
(2) 6Qualifying financial market participant4 means any of the following:
(a) a bank, investment firm, professional market maker in financial instruments or
other financial institution which (in each case) is subject to regulation or
prudential supervision;
(b) an insurance or reinsurance company;
(c) an undertaking for collective investment or an investment fund;
(d) a central counterparty or a payment, clearing or settlement system, or the
operator of such a system which (in each case) is subject to regulation, oversight
or prudential supervision;
(e) a corporation or other entity that, according to criteria determined by the
implementing State, is authorised or supervised as an important participant in the
implementing State4s markets in contracts giving rise to eligible obligations.
(3) 6Public authority4 means any of the following:
(a) a governmental or other public entity;
(b) a central bank;
(c) the Bank for International Settlements, a multilateral development bank, the
International Monetary Fund or any similar entity.
28. Id. princ. 7. Principle 7 provides:
Operation of close-out netting provisions in insolvency and resolution
(1) Subject to Principle 8 and in addition to Principle 6, the law of the implementing
State should ensure that upon the commencement of an insolvency proceeding or in the
context of a resolution regime in relation to a party to a close-out netting provision:
(a) the operation of the close-out netting provision is not stayed; . . .
(c) the mere entering into and operation of the close-out netting provision as such
should not constitute grounds for the avoidance of the close-out netting provision
on the basis that it is deemed inconsistent with the principle of equal treatment of
creditors;
29. Id. princ. 8.
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C. ISDARESOLUTION STAY PROTOCOL
The asymmetry between bankruptcy and bank insolvency caused
another problem that has required post-crisis adjustment. While the FDIC
has the power to impose the short stay in bank resolution, and many other
jurisdictions do the same, there is no guaranty that the short stay approach
will be recognized across international boundaries. A similar problem arises
under Dodd-Frank, which assumes that the usual approach to restructuring
SIFIs will be in bankruptcy, unless the use of bankruptcy, rather than
receivership, would have systemic effects.30 In order to ensure international
recognition of the short stay and to facilitate SIFI restructuring in
bankruptcy, regulators and the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) entered into a series of discussions about how one
might impose a short stay by contract. The result of these discussions was
the ISDA 2014 Resolution Stay Protocol (2014 Protocol). The approach
was to amend the master netting agreements handling derivative contracts
between and among signatory institutions to implement short stay
treatment. While the 2014 Protocol applied only to swaps, it has now been
superseded and expanded by the ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution Stay
Protocol (ISDA Protocol) which covers a broader range of derivatives. 31
D. SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY ! BAIL-IN
The ISDA Protocol is an integral part of a larger strategy advocated by
the FDIC to implement a so-called Nsingle point of entry8 approach to
resolution of large financial firms. The approach envisions a holding
company structure in which the parent company would be structured to
serve as a source of capital and liquidity should a financial shock strike one
or a number of its subsidiaries. In the event of a financial shock to one of its
subsidiaries, the parent would transfer assets to the subsidiary. The holding
company would then, if necessary, file for bankruptcy, or enter
receivership, while the recapitalized subsidiaries would continue to
operate.32 It is assumed that this resolution process would be accomplished
30. 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(2), (b)(2) (2012).
31. See 2014 ISDA RESOLUTION STAY PROTOCOL (INT4L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS4N
2014), https://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/protocol/20 (the protocol,
Nenables parties to amend the terms of their Protocol Covered Agreement to contractually
recognize the cross-border application of special resolution regimes applicable to certain financial
companies and support the resolution of certain financial companies under the United States
Bankruptcy Code.8). See also ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol, INT4L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS4N, http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/protocol/22
(last visited Mar. 6, 2016) (NThe operative provisions of the ISDA 2015 Universal Protocol are
nearly identical to the ISDA 2014 Protocol [except for the addition of an annex] . . . . that expands
the ISDA 2015 Universal Protocol to cover certain securities finance master agreements.8).
32. See Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry
Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76614 (Dec. 18 2013).
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in forty-eight hours, consistent with the short stay. Needless to say, the
strategy has not yet been tested.
To the extent that the parties to financial contracts are signatories to the
ISDA Protocol, early termination will not be a problem. However, this may
not always be the case. In order to facilitate reorganization in bankruptcy,
legislation has been proposed in Congress. There are currently Bills
pending in the Senate, and House of Representatives.33 The Senate Bill
contemplates the creation of a Chapter 14 of the Bankruptcy Code to
address the insolvency of financial firms. The House Bill would add a
number of provisions to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code that would
apply to financial firms. All versions contemplate a short stay to facilitate
the transfer of the firm4s assets to a bridge bank, and then transfer to a
solvent counterparty. For eligible firms, the bankruptcy safe harbors would
be overridden during the pendency of the short stay.
E.WORLD BANK STANDARD
As the discussion above shows, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis,
the short stay approach to financial crisis has expanded beyond bank
resolution to include the resolution of large financial firms, even in
bankruptcy. This posed a problem to the World Banks4 efforts to evaluate
the legal systems of countries that receive loans under their ROSC
Methodology. Until recently, their best-practice standard for debtor/creditor
regimes required treatment that tracked the pre-crisis safe harbor approach.
The World Bank convened a Task Force to determine whether the existing
standard was consistent with current best practice.34 In response, the World
Bank revised its standard C10.4 to allow for a regime that contemplated a
short stay to facilitate orderly transfer of a derivative portfolio.35
III. THE VOLUME
The Articles in this symposium volume discuss the issues above in
greater detail.
Riz Mokal examines the bankruptcy treatment of financial contracts
from an international perspective. He discusses the role of the safe harbors
as potential contagion accelerators, as well as the way in which they distort
investment incentives. He argues that, instead of increasing the safety of the
33. S. 1840, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1841, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 2947, 114th Cong.
(2015).
34. See World Bank, Working Group Meeting Notes, Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes
Principles: The Treatment of Financial Contracts in Insolvency (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTGILD/0,,cont
entMDK:23659444~menuPK:9771000~pagePK:4789622~piPK:64873779~theSitePK:5807555,0
_aL)2H fO/HH/j N^i-Q+) \+/(- VQQ)K0M U/)Q*8ea
35. See id.
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financial system, kl0I+(-)Th N*lOQ Ll+k/+*8 actually increase systemic risk
in two key ways. First, they create Nfroth8 by encouraging overinvestment;
and, second, they increase the macroeconomic risk faced by the banks that
invest in derivatives. In the process, he also reviews the legal evolution
described above, and, in particular, the process of amendment to the World
Bank4s best practice standard.
Anna Gelpern and Erik Gerding develop the concept of Nsafe assets8P
assets that capital markets treat as risk free. They explain how the safety of
these assets is constructed through a series of legally bestowed attributes,
credit enhancements (guarantees), and labeling. Some of these attributes are
created by private ordering, some by special legal treatment, and some
through public backstops. On the one hand, preserving the value of these
safe assets is an important aspect of the bank resolution regime, and the
bankruptcy safe harbors are an attempt to use special legal treatment to
enhance the safety of certain instruments. On the other hand, the need to
maintain the market perception (perhaps Nmyth8) of safety raises a number
of concerns about unanticipated risk in the financial system, and
nontransparent political choices. Their Article assesses the bankruptcy safe
harbors in this context.
Adam Levitin explores another mechanism for making assets Nsafe8P
clearinghouses. For certain instruments, instead of clearing directly, the
instruments clear through clearing intermediaries that have their own loss-
bearing capacity and impose margin requirements on participants. To the
extent that they are involved, clearinghouses do much of the work in
preserving the liquidity of Nsafe8 instruments by insuring against the failure
of clearinghouse members. In Levitin4s view, clearinghouses may preserve
the liquidity of financial instruments without some of the distortive effects
of the safe harbors. However, he acknowledges that, by concentrating risk
in the clearinghouses, they themselves may become Ntoo big to fail.8
Edward Janger and John Pottow directly address the asymmetry
between bankruptcy and bank resolution regimes for financial contracts,
and suggest changes to the Bankruptcy Code to implement symmetric
treatment. Dodd-Frank creates an Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) that
can be used to resolve SIFIs. However, the OLA is contemplated as a
backstop to the Bankruptcy Code, to be used only where necessary for
systemic risk reasons. Moreover, there are a significant number of financial
firms that may not be classified as SIFI4s, and can, therefore, only be
restructured in bankruptcy. The safe harbors make such restructuring
impossible. Janger and Pottow suggest that a short stay approach might be
extended to financial firms that use bankruptcy to restructure, and explore
the nuts and bolts changes that would have to be made to the Bankruptcy
Code to effectuate an orderly transfer or assumption of a derivatives
portfolio.
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Finally, Irit Mevorach discusses international recognition of resolution
orders. She acknowledges the importance of the ISDA Protocol, but notes
that since the Protocol does not cover all parties or all instruments, a legally
constructed recognition regime may be necessary as well. For this, she
advocates a regime that mirrors the recognition architecture used for
ordinary enterprises under the UNCITRAL Model Law for Cross-Border
Insolvencies.
Together, these Articles acknowledge the progress that has been made
in rationalizing the treatment of financial contracts in bank and bankruptcy
resolution, but also describe the steps that must be taken if the next
financial crisis is to be addressed in an orderly fashion.
